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NOTES
Securities Law—Rule 1013-5—Purchaser-Seller Requirement—Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores' — Blue Chip Stamp Company (Old
Blue Chip) was in the business of providing trading stamps to
retailers. 2 In 1963, the United States commenced a civil antitrust
action3 against Old Blue Chip and nine retailers who owned 90 per-
cent of its shares. 4 This action was terminated in 1967 by the entry of
a consent decree under which Old Blue Chip was to be merged into a
newly formed company (New Blue Chip). 5 The holdings of the major-
ity shareholders of Old Blue Chip were to be reduced by requiring
New Blue Chip to offer a substantial number of its shares to retailers
who had used the stamp service in the past, but who previously had
not been shareholders. 5 The shares were offered in units consisting of
three shares of common stock and a $100 debenture for a total price
of $101. 7 The number of shares offered to each retailer was propor-
tional to its past stamp usage." As required by section 5 of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act)," New Blue Chip tendered the
shares to each offeree by means of a prospectus."' Over 50 percent of
the units offered to the nonshareholder retailers were actually
purchased."
Two years after this offer, Manor Drug Stores, a former user of
the stamp service and one of the offerees who had not purchased any
of the units, brought a class action against Old Blue Chip, eight of its
nine majority shareholders, and New Blue Chip and its directors."
The complaint alleged violations of section 12 of the 1933 Act,' 3 sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act),"
' 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Id. at 725.
United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 . F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), affd
per curiam sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
421 U.S. at 725.
Id. at 725-26.
° Id. at 726.
Id. at 763 (Blackmun, j., dissenting).
" 421 U.S. at 726.
9 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
'° 421 U.S. at 726.
" Id.
' 2 1d.
13 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
14 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange—
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
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and Rule 106-5.' 5 Plaintiff asserted that New Blue Chip's prospectus
was materially misleading in that it was overly pessimistic in its ap-
praisal of New Blue Chip's current status and future prospects.'" It
was alleged that these pessimistic statements were made for the pur-
pose of discouraging the plaintiff and other members of its class from
accepting the offer, which had been priced below market value," so
that the rejected units could then be offered to the public at a higher
price.'" Plaintiff sought actual damages of $21,400,000, 1 " the right to
purchase the previously rejected shares at the original offering
price, 20 and exemplary damages of $25,000,000. 2 '
scribe .is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors.
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality Of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or,
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
" 421 U.S. at 726.
The prospectus contained the following statements, allegedly false and al-
legedly made to deter the plaintiff and its class from purchasing the units:
(1) that Inlet income for the current fiscal year will be adversely affected
by payments aggregating $8,486,000 made since March 2, 1968, in settle-
ment of claims" against New Blue Chip; (2) that net income "would be ad-
versely affected by a substantial decrease in the use of the Company's trad-
ing stamp service"; (3) that net income "would be adversely affected by a
sale of one-third of the Company's trading stamp business in California";
(4) that "Claims or Causes of Action (as defined) against the Company, in-
cluding prayers for treble damages, now aggregate approximately
$29,000,000"; and (5) that, based upon "statistical evaluations," "the Corn-
pany presently estitnates that 97.5% of all stamps issued will ultimately be
redeemed."
Id. at 763.64 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" 421 U.S. at 726-27. Plaintiff claimed that the reasonable market value of each
unit when offered was $315. Id. at 763 (Blackmun, j., dissenting).
'" 421 U.S. at 727.
"Id. This figure was obtained by multiplying the difference between the market
value and the offer price by the number of units that had not been purchased. Thus,
($3154101) X 100,000 = $21,400,000. Appendix at 12, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
20 Id. As this would amount to double recovery, it may have been requested as an
alternative remedy.
21 Id. The exemplary damages were apparently sought under a state claim that
was joined with federal claims under pendent jurisdiction. See Manor Drug Stores v.
Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35, 37 (C.D. Cal 1971), rev'd, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir.
1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Normally, exemplary damages are not recoverable
under federal securities laws, unless there is a state claim joined under pendent jurisdic-
tion. See Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
920 (1973); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970) (recovery under the 1934 Act limited to actual
damages). 465
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The district court dismissed the complaint on all counts, 22
reasoning, first, that the plaintiff was not a party to the antitrust con-
sent decree and therefore could not enforce it, 23
 and second, that sec-
tion 12 of the 1933 Act expressly required that a plaintiff be a
purchaser. 24 Since plaintiff had never purchased any units, he could
not maintain an action under this section." Finally, the district court
reasoned that the Birnbaum doctrine" required the plaintiff in an
action for damages under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to be a pur-
chaser or seller of securities. 27 Again, plaintiffs failure to purchase
the offered units precluded it from obtaining relief. 28
On appeal, plaintiff pressed only its claim under Rule 10b-5.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, in
a split decision." The majority reasoned that under the general rule,
only purchasers and sellers could sue for damages under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. 3 ° However, there were exceptions to this rule, espe-
cially where objective evidence of the plaintiffs intent to purchase or
sell but for the alleged fraud was offered. 31 In many of the cases find-
ing exceptions, there had been a contract to purchase or sell, which
furnished objective evidence of the potential transaction. 32 These con-
tracts also fixed the price, quantity, and time of the transaction,
thereby making it possible to calculate damages. 33 The majority
reasoned that the antitrust decree in the present case served the same
function as a contract; 34 to insist on an actual contract would subordi-
nate substance to form."
The dissent did not agree that the consent decree served the
same functions as a contract, because, unlike a contract, a consent de-
cree is not the statutory equivalent of a purchase or sale. 36 Further-
more, the consent decree did not create any legal rights or duties in
the plaintiff," Thus, the plaintiff was in the same position as any
other disappointed public offeree. 38 In addition, the dissent reasoned
22
 Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35, 40 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
" Id. at 38.
" Id. at 38-39.
25 Id.
" See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952).
" 339 F. Supp. at 39-40.
" Id.







"Id. at 143-44 (dissenting opinion). In the 1934 Act, the term "purchase" is de-
fined to include contracts to purchase or acquire securities. 15 U.S.C. 	 78c(a)(13)
(1970).
37




that the disadvantages of expanding the class of potential plaintiffs to
include those who are neither purchasers nor sellers would outweigh
the benefits, since the effect of such an expansion might so far unset-
tle the securities market as to defeat, rather than promote, the protec-
tive purposes of Congress in enacting the statute. 39
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, reversed the court of ap-
peals and HELD: Only an actual purchaser or seller of securities may
maintain a private action for damages under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. 4 " As plaintiff had neither purchased nor sold any of the of-
fered units in Blue Chip Stamps, its action was dismissed.'"
Since the purchaser-seller requirement was first enunciated in
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.," there has been much debate as to
whether private actions under Rule 10b-5 should be so limited. While
most courts have at least voiced approval of the Birnbaum doctrine,"
they have applied this rule expansively and flexibly, defining "pur-
chaser" and "seller" beyond their common law meaning." Only the
Seventh Circuit in Eason v. G.M.A.C." had expressly abolished the
purchaser-seller rule." However, the doctrine has been criticized by
many writers as being unduly arbitrary and restrictive. 47 By approving
the purchaser-seller requirement, the Supreme Court has resolved, at
least for the time being, one controversial aspect of private litigation
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
This note will begin by tracing the origin and development of
the purchaser-seller requirement. The reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Blue Chip Stamps will then be analyzed. Specifically, the legis-
lative history and policy consideratiOns relating to section 10(b) and
Rule 106-5, which were so much relied upon by the Court, will be ex-
amined to determine whether they truly support the Court's conclu-
sion. Other factors that the court did not mention—such as several of
the reasons for allowing private litigation under § 10(b)—will also be
discussed. Finally, an alternative to the Birnbaum purchaser-seller re-
quirement will be explored. It will be submitted that the Birnbaum
doctrine is unduly restrictive of section 10(b) protection and should
therefore be abolished by Congress.
1. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PURCHASER-SELLER RULE
In the early 1930's Congress enacted two major statutes regulat-
" Id. at 147-48.
" 421 U.S. at 731, 750-51.
4 ' Id. at 754-55.
42
 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
"Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733.
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806 (5th Cir. 1970). For example, a bene-
ficiary of a trust may sue under Rule 10b-5 where the securities have been fraudu-
lently purchased or sold. James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
45 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
" Id. at 661.
47 E S Lowenlels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5,
54 VA. L. REV. 268, 275-76 (1968).
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ing the securities area: the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.- The Securities Act of 1933 was concerned
primarily with the original issuance of securities, whereas the 1934
Act dealt mainly with the trading of securities in the open markets
and exchanges. 48
 The 1934 Act was enacted to prohibit manipulative
devices" and to require full and accurate discIosure. 50 Section 10(b)
was specifically enacted to accomplish these purposes 5 ' by authorizing
the SEC to promulgate appropriate rules and regulations. In re-
sponse, the SEC in 1942 promulgated Rule 10b-5, 52 which was copied
almost verbatim from section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 53
 However,
neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 expressly provide for private
remedies, and there is no indication that this relief was ever
considered. 54
This gap was filled in 1946, when the district court in Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co. 55
 held that a private remedy exists for violations
of Rule 10b-5.58
 This holding was finally approved twenty-five years
later by the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life
& Casualty Co. 57
 The purchaser-seller requirement followed closely on
the heels of the Kardon decision. The rule was first enunciated in
1952 by the Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp." In
Birnbaum, plaintiff stockholders of the Newport Steel Corporation al-
leged violations of Rule 10b-5 by Feldmann, the president and chair-
man of Newport's board of directors and owner of 40 percent of
Newport's common stock." Newport and Follansbee Steel Corpora-
tion, another steel company, had been negotiating a merger that
would have been highly favorable to all Newport shareholders. Acting
in his capacity as president, Feldmann rejected this offer. However,
4 " S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
"Id. at 7.
59
 Id. at 10- 1 1.
51
 Section 10(b)'s scope is very broad. One of the drafters of the 1934 Act noted,
"[Section 10(b)] says, Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices.'" Hearing on
H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 115 (1934). He also noted that this provision was a "catch all to prevent ma-
nipulative devices .... The Commission should have the authority to deal with new
manipulative devices." Id.
"See SEC Security Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 12, 1942).
53
 For an account of how Rule 10b-5 was drafted, see Remarks of Milton
Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922
(1967).
34 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 729-30.
55
 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
36 Id. at 513-14. Apparently, the Kardon court did not limit the plaintiff class to
purchasers and sellers. See id. at 514.
57
 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
58
 193 F. 2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The distin-
guished panel which decided this case was comprised of Judges Learned Hand, Thomas
Swan, and Augustus Hand, who wrote the opinion. At least one case decided before
Birnbaum allowed a nonpurchaser or nonseller to sue under Rule 10b-5. See McManus
v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., Civ. No. 8015 (E.D. Pa. 1948), cued in 59 YALE L.J. 1120,
1137 n.87 (1950).
59 193 F.2d at 462.
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he later sold his own stock to the Wilport Company at twice the
stock's market value. Plaintiffs alleged that Feldmann and others
made misrepresentations to them, both before and after his transac-
tions, in connection with the sale of his stock in violation of Rule
10b-5.°°
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action," and the court of appeals affirmed." The court of
appeals noted that prior to the adoption of Rule 10b-5, there had
been only two sections in the 1933 and 1934 Acts dealing with
fraudulent practices: section 17(a) of the 1933 Act° 3 (applicable only
to fraud committed upon purchasers of securities) and section I5(c) of
the 1934 Act" (applicable only to fraud committed upon sellers by
brokers or dealers)." The Securities Acts did not prohibit fraud by a
purchaser of securities who was not a broker or dealer. The court
reasoned that the SEC's purpose in promulgating Rule 10b-5 was to
close this existing loophole in the securities laws so as to prohibit
fraud committed by purchasers of securities." Emphasizing that Rule
10b-5 was copied almost verbatim from section 17(a), the court con-
cluded that the only purpose of this rule was to make the prohibitions
of section 17(a) applicable to purchasers as well as sellers." Thus, it
was held that section 10(b) "was directed solely at that type of misrep-
resentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or
purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of
- corporate affairs, and that Rule [10b-5] extended protection only to
the defrauded purchaser or seller.""
Although the court in Birnbaum relied on the SEC's apparent in-
" 0 1d.
°' Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 98 F. Supp. 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
(Kaufman, J.).
°' 193 F.2d at 462.63, 464.
" 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1970).
" 193 F.2d at 463.
66 1d., citing SEC Security Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), which
provides in part:
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the adoption
of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with the purchase
of securities. The previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of
securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The new rule closes a
loophole in the protections against fraudadministered by the Commission
by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they en-
gage in fraud in their purchase.
7
 193 F.2d at 463.
"Id. at 464. The Birnbaum doctrine actually consisted of two parts.
Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 ALA. L. REV. 542, 547 (1971). The
first part limited the scope of section 10(b) to the prohibition of fraud usually associated
with the purchase or sale of securities. This limitation was abolished in Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Gas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10-13 (1971). See Jannes v. Microwave
Communications, Inc., 461 F.2d 525, 528-30 (7th Cir. 1972). The second part of the
Birnbaum doctrine is the purchaser-seller requirement, and is thus the only part with
which Blue Chip stamps was concerned.
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tent in promulgating Rule 10b-5, 6" the SEC has since become disen-
chanted with the purchaser-seller requirement. In 1957 and again in
1959, the SEC urged Congress to amend section 10(b) to change its
wording from "in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity" to "in connection with the purchase or sale of, or any attempt
to purchase or sell, any security."'" The purpose of the proposed
amendments was threefold. First, the amendments were designed to
reach the "so-called front money racket." 7 t Second, the amendments
would have extended generally the reach of section 10(b) to include
fraud "in connection with attempts to buy or sell stocks as well as in
connection with consummated transactions." 72 Finally, the amend-
ments would have made unnecessary any proof of the elements of
conspiracy, "often difficult to make out."'" Congress failed to enact
these amendments each time they were proposed." Since then, the
SEC has submitted amicus curiae briefs in several cases urging judicial
elimination of the Birnbaum doctrine.'" Despite the controversy sur-
rounding the purchaser-seller requirement, the Supreme Court had
never ruled on its validity prior to the decision in Blue Chip Stamps.
II. BLUE CHIP STAMPS: A BLUE CHIP OFF THE OLD BIRNBAUM
In Blue Chip Stamps, the Supreme Court adopted the Birnbaum
rule and held that only an actual purchaser or seller may sue for vio-
lation of Rule 10b-5. 76
 First, on the basis of history, the Court con-
cluded that Congress' failure to reject Birnbaum despite opportunity to
do so and the lower courts' longstanding acceptance of the doctrine
were significant factors arguing for final acceptance of the
purchaser-seller requirement."
Second, the available extrinsic evidence, though not conclusive,
also supported the Birnbaum rule.'" As the Court noted, the "purchase
or sale" language of section 10(b) stands in contrast with that of other
provisions of the securities laws. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act,'" for
example, from which Rule 10b-5 was drawn, prohibits fraud "in the
" See text at note 67 supra.
T° S. 2545, 85th Cong.:1st Sess., cited in 103 CoNG. Rec. 11636 (1957); SEC Legis-
lation, Hearings on S. 1179 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking & Currency, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 294 (1959).
" Id. at 367. Under this scheme, a promoter will obtain money from a company
based on his fraudulent promise to distribute securities for the issuer. Id, at 367-68.
"Id. at 368. The securities industry feared that this amendment would make it
difficult to predict how far civil liability would be extended. Id.
" Id.
14 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 732.
TB E.g., Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
16
 421 U.S. at 755.
7 T1d. at 733.
Ts Id. at 733-36.
79
 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
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offer or sale" of securities. 80 Furthermore, as section 16(b) of the 1934
Acts' demonstrates, where Congress wished to expressly provide a
remedy to those who neither purchased nor sold securities, it had lit-
tle difficulty in doing so." Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act," which
limits recovery in any private damage action to "actual damages," also
lends support to the purchaser-seller requirement." A nonpurchaser
or nonseller could sue only for an "intangible economic injury," since
the determination of the number of shares he might have bought or
sold would depend on his "subjective hypothesis."85 Only an actual
purchaser or seller could base his recovery on a "demonstrable
number of shares traded," thus fulfilling the actual damages require-
ment of section 28(a)."
Support for the Birnbaum rule was also found in section 29(b) of
the 1934 Act." Section 29(b), which underlies the implied private
cause of action under section 10(b), 88 provides that a contract made in
violation of any provision of the 1934 Mt is voidable at the option of
the deceived party." This contract and, therefore, the implied private
cause of action, cannot exist where there has not been a purchase or
sale of securities." Moreover, those sections of the 1933 and 1934
Acts which do expressly provide for private civil remedies—sections
11(a)" and 12 12 of the 1933 Act, and sections 9(e)° 3 and 1894 of the
1934 Act—limit standing to purchasers and sellers." The court felt it
would be anomalous to impute to Congress an intention to expand
the plaintiff class for a judicially implied cause of action beyond the
limits set forth by Congress for a comparable express cause of
action."
Finally, policy considerations relating to the purchaser-seller re-
quirement were discussed. The majority agreed that the Birnbaum
doctrine was an arbitrary restriction preventing some deserving plain-
tiffs from recovering damages which were in fact caused by violations
of Rule 10b-5." Absent countervailing advantages, this fact alone
" Id. (emphasis added). See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 771 (1970) (both sections deal-
ing with offers).
81 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) (issuer may recover insider's profits from short
swing transaction).
" Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 734.
83 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970).
" Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 734-35.
88 1d.
8° Id. at 734.
87 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970).
" Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
"Id.
"421 U.S. at 735.
" 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
" Id. § 771.
" Id. § 78i(c).
54 Id. § 78n.
" 421 U.S. at 735-36.
' 6 Id. at 736.
" Id. at 738.
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would have rendered the Birnbaum rule undesirable as a matter of
policy, regardless of its support by precedent and legislative history. 98
However, other policy considerations, more important in the Court's
opinion, weighed in favor of maintaining the doctrine. 99
The Court stated that litigation under rule 10b-5 presented a
danger of vexatious abuse different in degree and in kind from that
inherent in other litigation.'" There was concern that in the field of
federal securities laws governing the disclosure of information, even a
tenuous claim has an inflated settlement -value far in excess of its
chances for success on the merits. This is true as long as the plaintiff
can avoid dismissal before trial.'" One reason given by the Court for
this inflated settlement value is that the pendency of the lawsuit may
interfere with the defendant's normal business activity even though
totally unrelated to the suit.'" Another reason is the possibility that a
plaintiff might abuse the discovery process.'" Thus, many corpora-
tions find it in their financial interest to settle, albeit at an inflated
value, rather than proceed to trial.'"
The Court's major concern, however, was that absent the
Birnbaum doctrine, and assuming no settlement, "the trier of fact
[would then be faced with] many rather hazy issues ... proof of
which [would depend] almost entirely on oral testimony."'" The
danger of abuse of oral testimony appeared to the Court to exist to a
particularly high degree in this type of action.'" Plaintiff's proof that
he failed to purchase or sell by reason of defendant's violation of Rule
1 Ob-5 could not be verified by documentation, but would depend to a
large extent on his uncorroborated oral testimony that he had been
influenced by the alleged misrepresentations.'" Much of this tes-
timony would concern matters exclusively within the plaintiff's own
knowledge, and thus could not be directly refuted by the
defendant.'" This peculiarity of proof, which works to the plaintiff's
advantage, would, the Court concluded, encourage plaintiffs to main-
tain vexatious suits based on dubious claims.'"
The Birnbaum doctrine was seen by the Court as mitigating this
problem of "blackmail suits" brought to force the inflated settlement
of a tenuous claim. Without the Birnbaum rule, an action under Rule
10b-5 would always turn on which party's oral testimony the jury
9° Id. at 738-39.
°° Id. at 739.
'Hid.
'°' Id. at 740-43.
'° 7 Id. at 740-41.
109 1d, at 741.
194 1d. at 740-43.
'" Id. at 743.
1 " Id.
107 Id. at 746.
1 " Id.
1°9 1d. at 746-47.
472
NOTES
would decide to credit."° There would be virtually no way to dispose
of the suit before a trial other than by settlement, no matter how im-
probable the plaintiff's allegations."' The Birnbaum doctrine was seen
to alleviate this problem by providing a basis for the pre-trial,
mechanical exclusion of nonpurchasers and nonsellers. Since the fact
of a purchase or sale is generally verifiable by documentation, failure
to qualify under Birnbaum may usually be established on a motion to
dismiss."' The rule was thus deemed to separate the group of plain-
tiffs who actually bought and sold securities, and whose version of the
facts was felt generally more likely to be believed by the trier of fact,
from the many plaintiffs who could get to trial in the absence of the
rule but who presumably would have little chance of success in prov-
ing their claim. 13 Indeed, without the purchaser-seller requirement, a
mere bystander could await a change in the market for a security
without risk of loss and then file a suit claiming that he had been left
on the sidelines due to fraud,'" The Court thus concluded that the
Birnbaum doctrine excludes those plaintiffs most likely to maintain
vexatious suits," 3 and therefore should be followed."°
In closing, the Court criticized the court of appeals' approach to
the case. The court below had concluded that plaintiffs status as an
offeree pursuant to the terms of the consent decree served the same
function of limiting the class of plaintiffs as was normally performed
by the requirement of a contractual, purchaser-seller relationship.'"
The Supreme Court stated, however, that persons with contracts to
purchase and sell are considered to be purchasers and sellers, not be-
cause of a judicial conclusion that they are similarly situated to pur-
chasers and sellers, but rather because the definitional provisions of
the 1934 Act give them such a status.'" Since these definitional provi-
sions make no reference to offerees, such persons are not considered
to be purchasers or sellers entitled to sue.'"
The Court further noted that although prominent emphasis
must be given in a prospectus to material adverse contingencies, there
was evidence that Congress did not intend to create a private action
for the loss of an opportunity to partake of a stock offering made




 Id. at 743.
" 4 1d. at 747.
15 See id. The dissent criticized this argument on the basis that it is speculative
and conjectural. The dissent also noted that it was unwarranted for the Court to take
judicial notice of the reasons for settling a case or of the difficulties of proof. Id. at
769-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" 6 421 U.S. at 749.
" 7 1d. at 749-50.
" Id. at 750-51, citing 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13), (14) (1970) which provides "(13)
The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contracts to buy, purchase, or other-
wise acquire. (14) The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise
dispose of." (emphasis supplied).
" 9 421 U.S. at 751.
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pursuant to the 1933 Act due to "an overly pessimistic prospectus.""°
Moreover, the court refused to imply such an action, despite a greater
likelihood of influence in this case—where plaintiff's managers had
read the trusted defendant's alleged misrepresentations—than there
would be in a case filed by a complete stranger to the corporation.' 2 '
Opening up the Birnbaum doctrine to such a case by case erosion
would result in a "shifting and highly fact-oriented disposition" 122 of
the standing issue, which would not be "a satisfactory basis for a rule
of liability imposed on the conduct of business transactions."'" As
plaintiff was neither a purchaser nor a seller it lacked standing to
bring a private action under Rule 10b-5. 124
In Blue Chip Stamps, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the
legislative and judicial history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts and on the
policy considerations underlying section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. It is
submitted, however, that these factors do not mandate the majority's
decision. Furthermore, an examination of the Birnbaum doctrine in
light of other considerations which the Court did not discuss leads to
the conclusion that the better decision would have been to overrule
Birnbaum.
The majority concluded that the lower courts' longstanding ac-
ceptance of Birnbaum and Congress' failure to amend section 10(b)
and reject the purchaser-seller requirement were significant factors
arguing for its acceptance. 125 It is unlikely that such -deference to ju-
dicial and legislative inertia was warranted. The Birnbaum court's
rationale in adopting the purchaser-seller requirement was based al-
most exclusively on the SEC's stated purpose in promulgating Rule
10b-5." 8
 However, at the time these statements were made the SEC's
limited goal was to extend the antifraud remedies protecting purchas-
ers under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act to include the protection of
sellers;'" the SEC has since argued that Rule 10b-5 should be given a
broader interpretation.'" Thus, the Birnbaum doctrine remains static
while its very underpinning has gradually changed. Furthermore, the
plaintiffs in Birnbaum were not connected with any actual or potential
transaction. They were never in the position of becoming purchasers
or sellers; there could not be any "connection" between the alleged
fraud and a purchase or sale by the plaintiffs. Thus, the plaintiffs in
Birnbaum were correctly denied standing, since the alleged action was
10 Id. at 752-54.
' 2 ' Id. at 754-55.
"2 1d. at 755.
123 id
'" Id. at 754-55.
"Id. at 733.
Ito 193 F.2d at 463.64; Comment, 6 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 230, 235 (1975). It
has been suggested that this rationale is not convincing. Boone & McGowan, Standing to
Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 Tex. L. REV. 617, 621 (1971).
'" SEC Security Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 12, 1942).
1!8 See text at notes 70-75 supra.
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not within the scope of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 12" But the fact
that the Birnbaum plaintiffs were correctly denied standing does not
adequately serve as the basis for a broad rule that all nonpurchasers
and nonsellers be denied relief.' 3 "
Congress' failure to amend section 10(b) in 1957 and 1959 does
not compel the conclusion that the Birnbaum doctrine was thereby ac-
cepted. First, in each year, the proposed amendment of section 10(b)
was only one item in several bills that would have modified many
other sections of the securities laws."' It appears that none of these
bills were ever enacted. Second, there were three reasons given for
the proposed amendment of section 10(b), only the second of which
related to the purchaser-seller requirement.'" Thus, even if Congress
did purposefully refuse to amend section 10(b) in particular, it is not
certain whether their refusal was based on a preference for the
purchaser-seller rule.
The Court also attempted to derive congressional intent favor-
able to the Birnbaum doctrine from an examination of other provisions
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts 133 limiting relief to purchasers and
sellers. 13 " The Court reasoned that it would be anomalous to expand
the plaintiff class for a judicially implied cause of action beyond that
for an express cause of action.' 35 Although this is the Court's most
persuasive argument,'" it is nevertheless of doubtful validity. The
"I ' See SEC Security Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 12, 1942).
' 3" The Supreme Court further failed to adequately examine the rationales that
the lower courts have used to justify the purchaser-seller requirement. For example, it
has been held that the Birnbaum doctrine is a standing requirement of constitutional stat ure.
Mount Clemens Indus.. Inc., v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339,343 (9th Cir. 1972). citing Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 793, 805-06 (5th Cir. 1970). Contra, Eason v. G.M.A.C., 490 F.2d 654,
657 (7th Cir. 1973). Hence, under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, a plaintiff must
show both injury in fact and that the interest he seeks to protect is within the zone of
interests protected by the statute. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 153 (1970). It has been claimed that only purchasers and sel-
lers can show injury of the type that Rule lOb-5 is meant to prevent. Herpich v. Wal-
lace, supra at 805-06. The majority in Blue Chip Stamps appears to agree, as it held that
only an actual purchaser or seller can suffer the requisite injury to maintain a private
action. See 421 U.S. at 734-35. The purchaser-seller requirement, however, is not neces-
sarily compelled by constitutional standing requirements. First, a nonpurchaser or non-
seller can certainly suffer injury in fact. See Note, Limiting the Plaintiff Class: Rule 1010
and the Federal Securities Code, 72 Micir, L. REV. 1398. 1412-13 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Plaintiff Class]. For example, the plaintiffs in Blue Chip stamps have possibly been in-
jured by the fraud allegedly perpetrated upon them because they were precluded from
accepting an advantageous offer which might have been profitable to them. In addition,
nonpurchasers and nonsellers are arguably within the zone of interests protected by
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See text at notes 138-52 infra.
' 3 ' See generally S.2544-2547, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), cited in 103 CONC. REC.
1163 l-4 I (1957); SEG Legislation, Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking &
Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
132 See text at notes 90-93 supra.
133 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 78i, 78r (1970).
' 3 ' 421 U.S. at 733.
'" Id. at 736.
"ll The concurring opinion in Blue Chip Stamps also concentrated on this argu-
ment. Id. at 755-56 (Powell. l., concurring).
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scope of section 10(b) is arguably broader than that of other sections,
since it was drafted as a "catch all" provision.'" Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 have always been interpreted broadly and flexibly to effec-
tuate their common remedial purposes.' 38 Therefore, the availability
of relief should be correspondingly broad.
The protections of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could reason-
ably be interpreted as extending to nonpurchasers and nonsellers.
These provisions prohibit all fraudulent practices "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." 13° Nothing in the text of these
provisions expressly limits their protection to actual purchasers and
sellers.'" As one court has noted, there is "no justification in the legis-
lative history of the Act or in the cases for reading this phrase as if it
read merely 'in the purchase or sale' rather than in connection with
the purchase or sale.' " 141 The phrase could just as well be construed
to include offers. 142 When the SEC drafted Rule 10b-5 almost ver-
batim from section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, it could have closely fol-
lowed the language of section 17(a) to prohibit fraud "upon the
purchaser or seller."143 Instead, the rule was broadly drafted to pro-
hibit fraud "upon any person . '1144 This expansive approach in
promulgating the rule argues against a narrow approach in its con-
struction.
Moreover, a careful reading of section 10(b) suggests that certain
nonpurchasers and nonsellers are expressly entitled to protection. One
theory of recovery in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,'" the first deci-
sion to allow a private remedy under Rule 10b-5, was the statutory
tort theory:' 48 A person who violates a statute is liable in a private ac-
tion for the harm done to another who is a member of the class pro-
tected by the statute.' 47 The Kardon court found this right of redress
"so fundamental and so deeply ingrained in the . law" that it should
not be denied unless the legislative intent to do so is very clear and
plain.'" Because certain nonpurchasers and nonsellers nonetheless
' 37
 See text at note 63 supra. See 1 A. BitomBERG, SECURITIES LAW—FRAUD—SEC
RULE 10b-5, § 2.5(6), at 45-46 (1974).
' 33 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 1970).
In 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) (emphasis added); 17 C.F.R. 	 240.10b-5 (1975)
(emphasis added).
" 0 See James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944, 949 (6th Cir. 1973).
' 41
 Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. III. 1967).
'" This interpretation was, of course, rejected in Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 463, as
well as in Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733 n.5. The "in connection with" clause has
usually been interpreted as requiring causation between the fraud and the purchase or
sale. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969); see 2 A. Bitoklatx6,supra note 137, § 7.6(2)(a), at 190.23-24.
13 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3) (1970).
1" 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5(c) (1975) (emphasis added).
'" 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
" 5 1d. at 513-14.
14 ' Id. The Kardon court based this theory on RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 286
(1934).
148 69 F. Supp. at 514.
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fall within the class protected by section 10(b)—investors—they
should have a private right of action for the harm done to them by a
violation of Rule 10b-5. 145
 This argument would be based on the lan-
guage of section 10(b) authorizing the SEC to promulgate rules "in
the public interest or for the protection of investors."'" The legisla-
tive intent to deny relief to these persons is not very plain and clear as
the Kardon court would require. Rather, as the Blue Chip Stamps Court
admits, the legislative history and intent is "not conclusive."""
Nevertheless, the Court refused to grant standing to nonpurchasers
and nonsellers.' 52
From a policy standpoint, the Court expressed the belief that the
Birnbaum doctrine appropriately curtailed the danger of vexatious
litigation under Rule 10b-5.' 53 While there may exist a great danger
of vexatiousness in Rule lob-5 litigation, it is submitted that the Court
has failed to adequately show that this danger of vexatiousness is dif-
ferent in degree or in a kind from that which accompanies litigation
in general. The court correctly observed that it is difficult to dispose
of a Rule 10b-5 suit before trial, other than by settlement.'" This dif-
ficulty, however, is present in many types of litigation. Whenever
there are complex factual issues which are hotly disputed, a settlement
is often the only alternative to a long trial. For example, summary
judgment is deemed inappropriate in complex antitrust litigation.'"
The Court also noted the related problem created by the dependence
on oral testimony at trial to prove facts known only by the plaintiff.
"'Defining who is, in Fact, an investor may be a difficult task. For example, the
Kardon court defined investors broadly: "1 cannot agree ... that 'investors' is limited to
persons who are about to invest in a security or that two men who have acquired owner-
ship of the stock of a corporation are not investors merely because they own half of the
total issue." Id. at 514. On the other hand, in Eason v. G.M.A.C., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.
1973), the court defined investors narrowly, apparently including only persons who
were principals or participants in the transactions. Id. at 659.60.
'" The term "investors" was not defined in the 1939 Act..
"I 421 U.S. at 733.
1 " Instead, the Court relied on the other theory used by the Kardon court—the
voidable contract theory. Id. at 735. The voidable contract theory is derived from 15
U.S.C. 78cc(b) (1970), which provides that a contract made in violation of the 1934
Act is voidable. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514. This section would be of little value unless
there was a remedy for the injured party "to relieve himself of obligations under it or
to escape its consequences." Id. at 514. The Blue Chip stamps Court argued that this jus-
tification for a private cause of action under Rule I0b-5 would be absent in the case of
a nonpurchaser or nonseller. 421 U.S. at 735. However, the statutory tort theory has
been more widely used as a justification for the implied private cause of action under
Rule 106-5 than the voidable contract theory. 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 137, §
2.4(I)(a), at 30.
I" 421 U.S. at 737-49. See text at notes 97-116 supra.
1"
 421 U.S. at 742.
1 " Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). There
the Court said: "We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in com-
plex antitrust litigation where motive and Intent play leading roles, the proof is largely
in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot." Id. See
C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL. COURTS § 99, at 441-46 (1970).
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However, the potential for perjury exists in litigation whenever one
party has exclusive knowledge of the facts to which he testifies: for
example, when state of mind or intention is a material issue. The bet-
ter solution to this problem of oral testimony, in any event, would be
to require some form of corroboration or independent evidence,' 5 °
rather than to preclude the plaintiff from presenting any proof due
to an arbitrary standing hurdle.
The Court was also concerned that the very pendency of a law-
suit may frustrate or delay normal business activity totally unrelated to
the suit.'" Any suit brought in good faith in which there exists a po-
tential for a large award will likely interfere with the defendant's
normal business.' 58
 Moreover, although the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allow liberal discovery,'" which might affect business activ-
ity, they provide ample protection against abuse of the discovery
process.'"
It is submitted that the Birnbaum doctrine does not meet or solve
many of the problems of vexatious litigation that so concerned the
Court in Blue Chip Stamps. The potential for vexatious suits under
Rule 10b-5 arises, not from the possibility that a nonpurchaser or
nonseller might sue, but rather from the very existence of a private
cause of action. Many of the dangers and effects of vexatious litiga-
tion also exist when bona fide actions are maintained by actual pur-
"" Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 26-27, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The Court rejected this approach, asserting that the need
for this sort of solution demonstrates the benefits of the Birnbaum doctrine. 421 U.S. at
744.
"I 421 U.S. at 740.
"" For example, any suit, whether bona fide or vexatious, might bring adverse
publicity to a defendant corporation. Cf. Sargent, The SEC and the Individual Investor: Re-
storing His Confidence in the Market, 60 VA. L. REV. 533, 562-72 (1974). The Court in Blue
Chip Stamps quotes Judge Friendly as saying that an "unduly expansive imposition of
civil liability will lead to large judgments, payable-in the last analysis by innocent inves-
tors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers ....'" 421 U.S. at 739, quoting
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). However, this statement was in reference to the dan-
gers of extending a defendant's liability to acts of negligence, and not to the dangers of
expanding the plaintiff class. In a case decided after Blue Chip Stamps, the Supreme
Court held that a defendant was not liable for damages under Rule 10b-5 absent an in-
tent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 44 U.S.L.W.
4451. 4454 (U.S. March 30, 1976). Courts should be more reluctant to hold a defen-
dant liable for his acts than to permit a plaintiff from suing. Otherwise, even if a de-
fendant is liable for a Rule 10b-5 violation which has caused injury to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff would not be able to recover. In many suits, other than in Rule 10b-5 litiga-
tion, innocent people already pay the costs of the award: consumers through higher
prices or subscribers of insurance through higher premiums. See Goldberg v. Kullsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 442-43, 191 N.E.2d 81, 86, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 600
(1963) (dissenting opinion).
159 See FED. R. Qv. P. 26-37.
'°° C. WRIGHT. supra, note 155, § 83, at 369. Abuse of discovery is not limited to
Rule 106.5 actions. There is great potential for such abuse in trade secret litigation,
for example, See id. at 372.
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chasers and sellers, 16 ' and the danger of vexatiousness would not be
inordinately increased by abolishing the purchaser-seller requirement.
A purchase or sale may be helpful in proving certain elements of a
Rule 10b-5 action—for example, damages. But the absence of a
purchase or sale would not necessarily preclude the plaintiff from
proving all the elements of a valid claim. Indeed, an actual purchaser
or seller may have an equally difficult time proving certain elements
of a Rule 1013-5 action.'" It would thus be more reasonable to require
better forms of proof than to preclude the plaintiff from bringing his
action in the first instance.'" Courts regularly face the possibility of
vexatious litigation and insufficient proof; they undoubtedly have the
expertise to decide these issues on a more flexible and equitable basis
than is done by the mechanical application of the Birnbaum
doctrine.'"
The only disadvantage of the Birnbaum doctrine which the Court
discussed was that its arbitrariness prevents some plaintiffs with
otherwise meritorious claims from successfully maintaining actions
under Rule 1013-5. 188 However, the Court failed to fully appreciate the
inconsistencies perpetrated in the name of the rule. Rule 10b-5 cur-
rently prohibits fraudulent practices which temporarily induce per-
sons not to purchase or sell;'" if, for example, a person discovers
fraud which had earlier induced him not to sell, and upon discovering
the fraud he does sell, he may bring a private action under Rule
10b-5. 107
 However, the injury has actually been incurred through the
induced retention of the shares, and not through the subsequent
sale.""
161 See note 162 and accompanying text infra.
"2 For example, a purchaser or seller must still prove the existence of a fraudu-
lent act proscribed by Rule 10b-5. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Stipp. 188,
197 (S.D.N.Y, 1968) ttff'd in part, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970). A purchaser or seller may still have to employ his own oral testimony to prove
reliance, although it may be inferred from materiality. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note i37,
§ 8.6(2), at 212. Reliance is the causal link between the fraud and the plaintiffs invest-
ment decision, Plaintiff Class, supra note 130, at 1418; the fact of a purchase or sale
alone cannot assist the plaintiff in proving his reliance. Proof of reliance is thus inher-
ently as difficult for the actual purchaser or seller as it is 6w the nonpurchaser or non-
seller.
103 See note 156 supra.
164 See Comment, supra note 126, at 252.
'66
	 U.S. at 738: The Court claimed that this disadvantage is to some extent
lessened, since the plaintiff will often have a state law remedy. Id. at 738 n.9. This state
remedy might not benefit such a plaintiff, however, because securities fraud is more
difficult to prove under state law than under Rule 10b-5. See Hooper v. Mountain State
Securities, Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); 1
A. Buosthemsupra note 137, 2.7(1), at 55-56.
1 " Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 521-22 (8th Cir. 1973); Stock-
well v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"'Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 2l9 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
1 " Even the Blue Chip Stamps Court admitted that a nonpurchaser or nonseller
may suffer injury as a result of a Rule I Ob-5 violation. 421 U.S. at 738.
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The plaintiff who has been induced not to purchase or sell may
accordingly suffer injury just as easily as an actual purchaser or
seller.'" A plaintiff who has been induced not to purchase a security,
as was the situation in Blue Chip stamps, may not be financially able to
purchase the securities at a later date. In addition, a plaintiff who has
been induced not to sell his shares may not want to sell or may not be
able to sell his holdings at a later date when he learns of the fraud.
For example, the SEC might suspend trading of the security,'" and it
would thereafter be very difficult for the defrauded shareholder to
dispose of his investment.
The situation of a plaintiff who has been induced not to sell his
investment is somewhat analogous to that of a plaintiff who had been
induced to actually purchase a particular security. In each instance,
the plaintiff owns a security which he would not have owned had
there been no fraud committed upon him. In the latter situation
where the plaintiff has been induced to purchase, the actual purchase
serves two functions. First, it of course serves to qualify the plaintiff
under the Birnbaum doctrine. But this purpose of requiring a
shareholder to purchase or sell would be unnecessary without the
purchaser-seller requirement. Likewise, a nonpurchaser or nonseller
would not need to complete a transaction in the absence of the
Birnbaum doctrine. Second, the purchase assists in measuring dam-
ages. The shareholder who has been induced not to sell, however, can
often determine the price at which he would have sold had there been
no fraud."' The fraudulently induced purchaser is not required to
subsequently sell his shares before he can maintain a private action
under Rule 10b-5. 12 Thus, requiring the nonseller plaintiff to actually
sell would appear to be a needless formality in the absence of the
Birnbaum rule." 3
This limitation of the Birnbaum doctrine—that it prevents per-
sons who have been induced not to purchase or sell from bringing a
private action under Rule 10b-5—undermines several of the reasons
for implying private actions for damages under Rule 10b-5. One of
these reasons is to encourage assistance in the enforcement of the
securities laws. 14
 Where the defendant's fraud induces people not to
purchase or sell, however, the only persons who ,would have the in-
centive to sue—the nonpurchasers and nonsellers who were actually
defrauded—are barred by the Birnbaum doctrine. Thus, under
Birnbaum, there is no private party to aid in the SEC's enforcement of
"9
 Plaintiff Class, supra note 130, at 1412.
"1' See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(2) (1970).
'" See text at note 211 infra.
'" 3 A. Baommac,supra note 137, § 9.1, at 226.
In
 Cf. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Corp., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1967).
'" Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 241




the securities laws where the fraud prevents the contemplated
transaction.' 75 Private damage actions also disgorge illegal profits
realized by the defendant as a result of his fraud.'" Disgorging the
violator's illegal profits acts as a deterrent against further fraud, and
in this manner, regardless of whether a securities transaction
occurred, a private action also assists the SEC in deterring future vio-
lations.
Another reason for allowing private damage actions is to com-
pensate the victim of the fraud.'" Injunctive remedies and criminal
penalties may halt and punish those who commit fraudulent practices,
but they do nothing to restore the loss of the defrauded victim. A
nonpurchaser or nonseller is just as vulnerable to injury as an actual
purchaser or seller.'" Only if investors know that they can be com-
pensated for injuries resulting from fraud will there be confidence in
the securities markets and will the compensatory purpose of the pri-
vate action be effectuated.'" As the Court in Blue Chip Stamps
recognized,'" the Birnbaum doctrine arbitrarily precludes some of
these injured persons from any compensation under federal law.
In summary, the Birnbaum doctrine is mandated neither by legis-
lative history and intent nor by policy considerations. The purchaser-
seller requirement does not solve the problem of vexatious litigation.
Most importantly, the purposes of the securities laws are hindered by
retention of the rule.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE TO BIRNBAUM
Any alternative to the Birnbaum doctrine should have the capabil-
ity of extending section 10(b) protection to injured persons without
imposing arbitrary and irrelevant restrictions on the ability to recover
under Rule lOb-5. Abolition of the Birnbaum doctrine,"' however,
1 " Private injunctive relief may be sought by nonpurchasers and nonsellers.
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967). Such relief,
however, is ineffectual where the fraud has already been completed, as in Blue Chip
Stamps.
"" Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965).
'" Note, 16 B.C. IND. & Cont. L. REv. 503, 512 (1975).
"8 Plaintiff Class, supra note 130, at 1412.
179 Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. de-
nied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
' 8" 421 U.S. at 738.
181 After the Blue Chip Stamps decision, only Congress could eliminate the
Birnbaum doctrine. Prior to Blue Chip Stamps, it was uncertain whether the SEC had the
authority to abolish the purchaser-seller rule. See generally, 3 A. BRomattitc., supra note
137, § 12.9, at 286 (SEC has limited authority to change Rule 10b-5). On the one hand,
it has been argued that the Birnbaum court based the purchaser-seller requirement sole-
ly on Rule 10b-5, Comment, 6 LovoLA U. CH1.14 230, 239 (1975), and therefore the
SEC could abolish the rule by amending Rule 10b•5. See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1469 n.87 (1961). On the other hand, if the Birnbaum doctrine is based on
10(b), Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806 (5th Cir. 1970), then the S.E.C. would
have no authority to change the purchaser-seller requirement. After Blue Chip Stamps,
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would not necessarily require that any and all persons be allowed to
bring a Rule 10b-5 action. Section 10(b) was not intended to "establish
a scheme of investors' insurance."'" Instead, Congress sought to
purify the investment decision-making process, rather than protect
the individual investor.'" Rule lOb-5 effectuated this purpose of
promoting free and open securities markets and protecting the invest-
ing public from inequities in trading.'" Thus, standing should be
granted to any plaintiff who has been defrauded by a Rule 10b-5 vio-
lation that affects the investment decision making process rather than
merely an actual investment. Under this standard, a plaintiff would be
required to allege that he has made an actual investment
decision—either to consummate a transaction or to refrain from com-
pleting a purchase or sale. 1 "S An actual purchaser or seller has made
an investment decision by the fact of his purchase or sale.'" However,
a decision not to put-Chase or sell can be equally as important.'" By
committing himself to either type of decision, the investor may suffer
injury. Hence, a plaintiff should not be denied standing solely because
the fraud induced him to refrain from purchasing or selling se-
curities.
A plaintiff should be required to prove his investment decision
by evidence which is either independent of or at least corroborative of
his oral testimony. A purchaser or seller could meet this proof re-
quirement by introducing evidence of his purchase or sale. In such
cases, there is an outward manifestation of action on his part. A non-
purchaser or nonseller, on the other hand, usually has not manifested
any visible act. A person who has made an actual decision not to
purchase or sell is often outwardly and objectively indistinguishable
from a person who merely has failed to make any type of decision.
Moreover, the fact of an investment decision is often solely within the
plaintiff's knowledge and cannot be disproved. Thus, a plaintiff who
has not made a decision would easily be able to claim that one had in
the SEC has no authority to eliminate the purchaser-seller rule by any method, because
the majority justifies the Birnbaum doctrine in light of congressional intent and policy
considerations, which supersede the Commission's authority.
' 82
 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965).
"3 Note, 53 N.C.L. REV. 150, 158 (1974).
Is' SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
"' In addition, the plaintiff must allege, and later prove, that his investment de-
cision was caused by the defendant's fraud. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,
462 (2d Cir.), cm. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Note, Limiting the Plaintiff Class: Rule
10b-5 and the Federal Securities Code, 72 MICH. L. REX'. 1398, 1418 (1974). For a discussion
of proof of reliance, see note 156 supra. The fraud must be material; that is, of such a
nature that "a reasonable man would attach importance [to it] in determining his course
of action." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968). There-
fore, a material fraud is one which necessarily will affect the decision making process.
Is° But cf: Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634-35 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
389 U.S. 970 (1967).
'" Plaintiff Class, supra note 185, at 1425.
482
NOTES
fact been made. Objective evidence of an investment decision, there-
fore, would separate the bona fide plaintiff who in fact made a deci-
sion, from the opportunistic plaintiff who made no decision but claims
later that he was defrauded.
Several forms of evidence would be acceptable. First, documen-
tary evidence might be offered to show an investment decision.' 88 For
example, the plaintiff may have mailed a letter in which he rejected
an offer made to him.' 89 Second, indirect or circumstantial proof in
the form of an inference could be allowed: an investment decision
could be inferred from the plaintiffs failure to accept an offer. if an
offer has been presented to the plaintiff and he has knowledge of it,
the fact of his failure to accept the offer implies that he made a deci-
sion not to accept.' 9° This would still be objective evidence, because it
could be offered independent of the plaintiffs oral testimony. This
would be an acceptable inference in a closed transaction situation,
where the parties are dealing face-to-face, because the plaintiff would
then certainly have knowledge of the offer.'" In the open market
situation, however, where offers are not made to particular individu-
als, and where knowledge of the offer is uncertain, this inference
"" See Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH
FEU. SF:C. L. REP. 592,951, at 98,705-06 (N.D. ill. 1969) (attempted acceptance of an
offer by telegram).
" 9 This documentary evidence, like any other evidence, may always be im-
peached. For example, it might be shown that the plaintiff never had any intention of
purchasing securities, by showing that he had sent many such letters indicating his in-
tention not to purchase, in anticipation of hitting at least one offering subsequently re-
vealed to be tainted by fraud.
' 9° Note that this conclusion does not require a further conclusion that an act of
the offeror caused the plaintiff to reject the offer. Causation is a separate issue from
the question of whether an investment decision of' the "no purchase" or "no sale" vari-
ety was made. Treating causation separately allows for the fact that in most instances,
an offeror will not simultaneously make an offer and then engage in fraud to induce
the offeree not to accept. It would be pointless for an offeror to voluntarily make an
offer which he did not want the offeree to accept. Blue chip stamps, in which the of-
feror induced the offeree not to accept, is an unusual case in this respect. But it must
be remembered that the offer in Blue Chip Stamps was not voluntarily made; rather, it
was mandated pursuant to an antitrust decree. However, a third person might not want
a voluntary transaction to be completed, and might induce the offeree not to accept. See
Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
9 92,951, at 98, 701 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
" 1 A plaintiff's failure to accept an offer should be questioned in any instance
where the offer is not made directly to the plaintiff. The plaintiff should be required to
prove that he had knowledge of the offer.
A situation where this presumption may have been valuable at one time is the
tender offer case. Tender offers have become increasingly common since the early
1960's. H. REP. No. 1711, 2 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News 2811-12, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968). Originally, a nonpurchaser or nonseller defrauded in a tender offer situa-
tion had no recourse under Rule 10b-5. Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.,
417 F.2d 963, 965 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970). Section 14(e) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970), added to the 1934 Act in 1968, now provides a
private right of action in favor of such nonpurchasers and nonsellers. Smallwood v.
Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596-97 & n.20 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 419 U,S. 873
(1974).
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would be less warranted. In this situation, greater proof would be
required.' 92
In addition to offering proof of an investment decision, the
plaintiff must also show that this decision was caused by the alleged
violation of Rule 10-5. 193 Where there has been a material misrep-
resentation, it may have the effect, if not the purpose, of inducing a
particular investment decision—either to purchase or sell, or to re-
frain from doing either. If the plaintiff has not made any investment
decision, he should be denied standing. However, if the plaintiff has
made a decision, he must still prove that it was caused by the
defendant's fraud; he must show reliance.'" As reliance is a subjective
test, proof is usually by the plaintiff's oral testimony. Reliance may
also be inferred from materiality.'" In any event, a nonpurchaser or
nonseller who has in fact made an investment decision does not neces-
sarily have a more difficult time in proving reliance than an actual
purchaser or seller. A purchase or sale is not proof of reliance; re-
liance is a test of causation, and the purchase or sale could have been
caused by factors other than fraud.'"
In determining causation, a nondisclosure situation presents dif-
ficulties not encountered in a misrepresentation case. Unlike the ef-
fect of a misrepresentation, the effect of a nondisclosure may be to
induce the plaintiff not to make any investment decision, at least with-
respect to the undisclosed information. For example, if a corporation
does not disclose adverse information, a shareholder might not sell his
interest in that corporation, though he would have sold if the informa-
tion had been disclosed. The nondisclosure does not induce a
shareholder to make a decision not to sell; rather, it induces him to
make no decision at all. Therefore, the requirement of an actual in-
vestment decision in a nondisclosure case is analytically unwarranted.
In a nondisclosure case, where no investment decision has been made,
the element of active reliance becomes meaningless.' 97 The proper
1 " Some forms of proof would not be acceptable, because they would be either
not relevant or too speculative. The Court is correct in suggesting that receipt of a
prospectus or ownership of stock are not acceptable. These do not show that an invest-
ment decision has been made. 421 U.S. at 747.
"3 See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965).
194 Plaintiff Class, supra note 185, at 1418. Reliance limits invocation of Rule 10b-5
only to those plaintiffs who were in fact defrauded. Financial Programs, Inc. v. Falcon
Financial Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 770, 775 (D. Ore. 1974). Although a plaintiff may
have suffered injury resulting from a Rule 10b-5 violation, he cannot recover unless he
has been defrauded. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1965).
"5 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw-FRAun
-SEC RULE 10b-5, I 8.6(2) at 212
(1974).
Im See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965) where it was determined that the plaintiff would have sold his stock, regardless
of any fraud. Id. at 464.
197 Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corpora-
tion Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 CoLum, L. REv, 1361; 1370 (1965).
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test of causation should be whether the plaintiff would have acted dif-
ferently had there been full disclosure." 8
This test, however, is not without problems, for it is often dif-
ficult to determine how a plaintiff would have acted had there been
full disclosure. In most instances, a plaintiff would not be able to offer
direct proof that he would have acted differently. However, since a
plaintiff could easily allege that he would have acted differently, the
amount of Rule 10b-5 litigation might dramatically increase. This in-
crease, though not harmful in itself, would be injurious if much of it
were comprised of unmeritorious claims. Such a situation is better
managed, however, by the requirement of proof than through the
prerequisite of standing. In Rule 10b-5 litigation, even an actual
purchaser or seller may have difficulty in showing that he would have
acted differently had certain disclosures been made. 199 There is thus
little reason to deny standing to one potentially affected by the same
nondisclosure merely because he has not completed a transaction.
Since direct proof of causation where nondisclosure is involved is
almost impossible, it becomes necessary to employ inferential proof.
In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 200 the court
held that causation in fact is to be inferred from the materiality of the
defendant's violation of Rule 10b-5, because the plaintiffs might have
considered the undisclosed information important in making their de-
cision to purchase stock."' If causation is to be established from the
fact of materiality, nonpurchasers and nonsellers would benefit from
such an inference equally with actual purchasers and sellers, since
both groups would by definition attach importance to the material
nondisclosure. 202 However, a causation test based upon materiality
would bear little relation to whether the plaintiff. would have actually
acted differently. An inference based on materiality would allow
standing to everyone because, again by definition, all reasonable men
would attach importance to a material fraud.
A causation test that would be more relevant to the issue of
whether the plaintiff would have acted differently had there been full
disclosure is one that would examine the nature of the plaintiff. Some
plaintiffs are more likely than others to have acted differently, since
their activities in the marketplace and their motives for investing are
different. 203 Actual purchasers, sellers, and those who made a
documented investment decision are the plaintiffs most likely to have
acted differently. Since these persons were actively involved and
I " Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d
Cir. 1974), citing List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F,2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965).
"" See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965) (plaintiff would have still sold his stock even if there was full disclo-
sure).
2" 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir, 1974).
2 ° , Id. at 240.
0" See note 177 supra.
208
	 The Measure of Damages in Rule 106-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Se-
curities, 26 STAN. L. REv. 371, 379 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Damages].
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committed themselves on the basis of incomplete information, it is
doubtful that they would have continued to act to their detriment had
they knowledge of all material information.
The next category of plaintiffs are shareholders defrauded by a
nondisclosure who have not made any investment decision; since they
have been passive, it is more difficult to determine whether they
would have acted differently. There are many different types of
shareholders. A speculator, trader, or institutional holder is very likely
to have acted differently since he is probably very informed with re-
spect to his investment. A long term shareholder, on the other hand,
might have held on to his holdings regardless of the existence of ad-
verse information.'" There is, of course, no sharp dividing line
separating various types of shareholders. The courts would likely have
to sift through the facts of each case to determine if the plaintiff had
met his burden of proving causation in fact. The problem of proving
causation in fact, however, exists in many other types of litigation.'"
It is submitted that the difficulties of determining causation in fact are
outweighed by the disadvantages of arbitrarily precluding defrauded
nonpurchasers and nonsellers from suing under Rule 1013-5. 2"
Even after a plaintiff has shown that his investment decision
making process was affected and that he was injured, he must still
prove his damages. Proof of damages is, of course, not a requisite of
standing. Nonetheless, it deserves brief consideration here because of
the unique problems of the new class of potential plaintiffs who would
have standing under the investment decision rule. To prove his dam-
ages, the plaintiff must establish the terms of the transaction, namely,
the number of shares and the price of each. An actual purchaser or
seller can readily prove what these terms were. However, a non-
purchaser or nonseller can only show what these terms might have
been but for the defendant's fraud, since the transaction was never
completed. In general, a nonpurchaser or nonseller will have greater
difficulty in proving the terms of the aborted transaction. Indeed, in
the nondisclosure situation no transaction may ever have been
contemplated, thus rendering even more difficult the task of evaluat-
ing damages. Yet, a plaintiff should not be denied relief solely be-
cause the amount of damages is difficult to determine."' Objective
evidence should once again be required; inferences and presumptions
based on the objective evidence may be an appropriate compromise.
In the case of a closed transaction where there exists an offer in-
volving a particular number of shares, a presumption that the plain-
"'Id. Nonsharcholders who have not made an investment decision do not have a
sufficient nexus to the particular security involved and should not be granted standing,
even though it is possible that such a person would have acted differently. Otherwise,
the nonshareholder who 'has not made an investment decision could always sue with re-
spect to fraud affecting any security.
"5 See W. PROSSER. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS. § 41 (4th ed. 1971).
'°° See text at notes 174-80 supra.
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tiff would have accepted the offer in full should exist. Similarly, it
should be presumed that a shareholder would have sold all his shares
in the open market were it not for the defendant's fraud. These pre-
sumptions are justified, because it is rational for a person to maximize
his profits by accepting a profitable and advantageous offer in full, or
by selling all his shares. These presumptions might not be accurate in
every case. 21 s However, the impact of these presumptions would be
limited by the fact that they could be rebutted. 21"
A nonpurchaser or nonseller may also have trouble determining
the price at which he would have purchased or sold a security. This
problem is minimized in a closed dealing where the price is fixed. In
an open market situation, however, where the price of a security is
continually fluctuating, a nonpurchaser or nonseller will have greater
difficulty in proving the price at which he would have completed the
transaction. 2 " However, at least in a misrepresentation case, the plain-
tiff has already established an investment decision. From this decision,
the date of the aborted transaction can often be determined and a
price can then be estirnated. 2 " Since a plaintiff defrauded by a non-
disclosure may not have made an investment decision, he may not be
able to offer sufficient proof of his damages.
This proposed alternative to the Birnbaum doctrine satisfies the
concerns of the Blue Chip Stamps Court. First, it is consistent with the
legislative scheme of the securities laWs, because it protects those per-
sons who ought to be protected by Rule 10b-5. 212 By requiring objec-
tive evidence and sensible standards of proof, 2 " this alternative meets
most of the Court's concerns about vexatious litigation. Although
208 Even in criminal law, presumptions are allowed, although they are not en-
tirely accurate. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 395, 405-18 (1970).
2"9 For example, it might be shown that the plaintiff' customarily sold only part of
his holdings at a particular time, or that the particular situation did not warrant a com-
plete sell out. The presumptions would certainly better effectuate the purpose of allow-
ing private actions under Rule 10b-5 than the exclusion of all defrauded nonpurchasers
and nonsellers.
2 " Proving damages in the open market is difficult even for the actual purchaser
or seller. See generally Damages, supra note 203, at 374-76.
2" Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
Sic. L. REP.I192,591, at 98,703-04 (N.D. III. 1969). Perfect accuracy in measuring dam-
ages in open market transactions is never attainable. Damages, supra note 203, at 385
n.72. Relief' should be denied if the amount of damages is unreasonably speculative.
For example, where insiders are violating Rule 10b-5 by trading in a security without
disclosing inside information, the price of the security may fluctuate greatly in a very
short time. See, e.g., Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 233 n.8 (selling by tippees allegedly caused
Douglas Aircraft stock to decrease by 18 points in 3 days). The price at which a non-
purchaser or nonseller would have consummated a transaction in this situation is totally
unpredictable. Indeed, nonpurchasing and nonselling plaintiffs will allege that they
would have completed a transaction if there had been full disclosure. However, if all
these plaintiffs had attempted to sell or purchase, their transactions, in combination
with those of the insiders, would have caused even sharper price fluctuations. Under
such circumstances, damages would be even more unpredictable.
212 See text at notes 199-203 supra.
'" Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 711 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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some vexatious claims could exist under the proposed alternative, this
vexatiousness would be of the sort that even the purchaser-seller re-
quirement would not be able to eradicate, and it may best be solved
by methods less drastic than a denial of standing. 214
In addition, allowing nonpurchasers and nonsellers to sue under
Rule 10b-5 would best effectuate the purposes of allowing private liti-
gation under the securities laws. A person who has been injured in
connection with a securities transaction would be compensated for his
loss. Elimination of the restrictive Birnbaum doctrine would thus help
to increase confidence in the securities markets. Moreover, immunity
from private actions would no longer automatically exist where the
defendant's fraud induced people to refrain from purchasing or sel-
ling securities. Finally, profits would be disgorged from wrongdoers.
It is likely, however, that most of those who would gain standing
as a result of the Birnbaum doctrine's elimination will have been in-
volved in closed transactions or direct offer situations where there was
"some semblance of privity""s between the parties to the
transaction."° Very few nonpurchasers and nonsellers who were de-
frauded with respect to open market transactions are likely to be able
to offer sufficient proof in order to successfully litigate a claim under
Rule 10b-5. On the one hand, this will as a practical matter exclude
2 " For example, section 10(b) should be amended to allow the court to require
the plaintiff to post security or to assess costs against a litigant. Since private actions
under section 10(b) are a judicial invention, costs are not normally awarded. "In excep-
tional circumstances, however, where the behavior of a litigant has reflected a willful
and persistent 'defiance of the law', a court of equity has the power to charge an ad-
verse party with plaintiffs counsel fees as well as court costs." Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424
F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970). Each of the express private
remedy provisions in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 771, 78i(e), 78r(a),
contains a provision similar to that in 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e):
In any suit under this or any other section of this subchapter the court
may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs
of such suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, and if judgment shall be
rendered against a party litigant, upon the motion of the other party liti-
gant, such costs may be assessed in favor of such party litigant (whether or
not such undertaking has been required) if the court believes the suit or
the defense to have been without merit, in an amount sufficient to reim-
burse him for the reasonable expenses incurred by him, in connection with
such suit, such costs to be taxed in the manner usually provided for taxing
of costs in the court in which the suit was heard.
The purpose of these provisions was to alleviate the fear of strike and vexatious suits.
See 78 CONG. REC. 8669 (1934) (remarks of Senator Fletcher). Apparently, "Whis section
provides 'for more unrestricted recovery than would be possible at common law "
Acker v. Schulte, 74 F. Supp, 683, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), citing Baird v. Franklin, 141
F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion). In general, costs are awarded under these
express remedy provisions when a claim is brought in bad faith or without merit. Acker
v. Schulte, supra at 684.
215 Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), affd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
116 The Blue Chip Stamps Court discussed the history of the tort of misrepresenta-
tion and deceit, noting that this tort has developed in connection with personal transac-
tions, in sharp contrast to transactions being conducted over the nation's securities mar-
kets today. 421 U.S. at 744-45.
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many claims with extremely large damages, in which the plaintiff's
losses might greatly exceed the defendant's illegal gains."' Thus, the
suggested alternative to Birnbaum would not automatically overburden
the defendant with excessive judgments. On the other hand, however,
the protective purposes of the 1934 Act will not be carried out to the
fullest extent possible if nonpurchasers and nonsellers are not pro-
tected to some degree in open market dealings.
ROBERT E. Fox
Antitrust Law—Application of the Data Processing Standing Test
in Treble -Damage Actions—Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp.'—In
1968, Malco Petroleum, Inc., three real estate investment companies,
and Jack and Anne Malamud, the officers, directors, and sole
shareholders of the four corporate plaintiffs, instituted an action
against Sinclair Oil Corp. in federal district court alleging violations of
section I. of the Sherman Acts and section 3 of the Clayton Acts aris-
ing out of a series of transactions between the parties.' Sinclair and
Malco had entered into a distribution agreement in 1965. 5 Under the
terms of the agreement, Sinclair promised to supply Malco with pe-
troleum products for resale to retail customers. The parties to the
agreement also arrived at an oral understanding whereby Sinclair was
to supply financial assistance to the three investment companies to aid
them in acquiring and developing new service stations.° Subsequent to
the agreement, Sinclair refused financial assistance in five possible ac-
quisitions proposed by Jack Malamud acting as an officer of the in-
vestment companies.' After Sinclair had refused to assist in all five of
the proposed ventures, Jack Malamud negotiated a new contract with
Texaco, Inc. and unsuccessfully sought an early termination of the
contract between Malco and Sinclair.° Subsequently, the contract ran
its course and, upon termination, Malco executed a new distribution
agreement with Texaco, Inc. covering those service stations which had
previously been supplied by Sinclair.°
The gist of plaintiffs' antitrust claim was that the agreement be-
tween Sinclair and Malco required Malco to secure its supply of prod-
" 7 See Note, 16 B.C. IND. & 0.0.1. L. RE v. 503, 512.13 (1975).
521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
' 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
'Ma/amud, 521 F.2d at 1144-45.
5 1d. at 1144.
Id.
Id,
Id.
Id.
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